Researchers forge RSA signatures on a key inside a hardware security module without extracting it
UC San Diego and INRIA researchers say they forged RSA signatures on a 1,024-bit key held in a hardware security module without extracting the key.
Why it matters
Hardware security modules are how custody firms keep private keys from ever existing outside the device, and a forgery that needs no key extraction narrows what that arrangement actually protects. The authors say padded keys used in current deployments sit outside the attack's reach, and no vendor response appears in this set, so the practical exposure for custodians is not established.
Key facts
The team submitted its paper to the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive on September 20.
Reported by Decrypt
The attack required roughly 2^32 signing requests, about four billion.
4,000,000,000 signing requestsReported by Decrypt
The attack consumed 1,380 CPU core-years.
1,380 CPU core-yearsReported by Decrypt
The authors say the attack likely poses no immediate threat to most modern RSA deployments, which use padding.
Reported by Decrypt
Bitcoin and most larger blockchains sign with ECDSA rather than RSA, and the paper's claims cover RSA only.
Reported by Decrypt
BitGo said institutional custody providers use hardware security modules so private keys never exist outside the device.
Reported by Decrypt
What happened
Decrypt reported that researchers at UC San Diego and INRIA forged RSA signatures on a 1,024-bit key stored in a hardware security module, the tamper-resistant devices custody providers use to keep private keys from leaving the device. The key stayed inside the module throughout; the team submitted its paper to the IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive on September 20. Decrypt put the cost of the attack at roughly 2^32 signing requests, about four billion, plus 1,380 CPU core-years, and said the authors expect no near-term risk to most modern RSA deployments because those use padding. The work does not reach Bitcoin or Ethereum, which sign transactions with ECDSA rather than RSA, though Bitcoin's curve also supports Schnorr signatures. Decrypt cited BitGo on how institutional custodians use these modules, and it is the only outlet in this set carrying the claim, so the finding rests on one report of an ePrint submission rather than on independent confirmation.
How the story developed
- Update
Attack paper submitted to IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
UC San Diego and INRIA researchers posted the RSA signature forgery work against a hardware security module to the archive on September 20.
- First report
First report by Decrypt
A Clever RSA Attack Fooled a Hardware Vault—Here's What It Means for Crypto
- Update
Decrypt publishes the account of the attack
Decrypt reported the 1,024-bit key forgery, the four-billion-request and 1,380 CPU core-year cost, and the authors' view that padded RSA deployments are not at immediate risk.
Affected entities
Original sources
| Publisher | Report | Role | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| Decrypt Crypto media | A Clever RSA Attack Fooled a Hardware Vault—Here's What It Means for Crypto | Original |